Demonstration · Transport
ZAPLink: sealed datagram transport
ZAPLink carries a post-quantum-sealed, signed payload between two agents over a single UDP datagram, with no connection setup and no handshake round trips. Because the seal and signature are computed before the packet is sent, the only thing on the wire is the delivery itself.
Measured
End-to-end latency vs common transports
Medians from a local benchmark run on 2026-10-23, same host, same payload class. ZAPLink delivers a sealed, signed message in roughly a third of the time an HTTPS/TLS exchange takes, because it adds no handshake round trips.
| Transport | End-to-end median | Adds PQC seal + signature? |
|---|---|---|
| SFTP / FTPS (one file) | 104.7 ms | No: classical transport, plain copy |
| ZAPLink (A2A over the diode) | 122.6 ms | Yes: ML-KEM seal + ML-DSA signature |
| HTTPS / TLS, cold | 303.0 ms | No: classical TLS handshake |
| HTTPS / TLS, session resumed | 310.5 ms | No |
| SMTP + STARTTLS (one mail) | 735.9 ms | No |
The cryptographic work is cheap and happens off the critical path: sealing a payload measured ~17.9 ms and reading it back ~7.5 ms, against a network round-trip of ~104.7 ms. ZAPLink is close to the raw SFTP floor while carrying a post-quantum seal and a signature that SFTP and TLS do not.
How it is fast
No handshake on the critical path
No TCP connect, no TLS negotiation; the seal and signature are already done when the packet leaves.
The honest caveat
ZAPLink does not yet provide forward secrecy
A fast, post-quantum-sealed channel is not automatically a forward-secret one, and we will not let the speed number imply a property the transport does not have.
FLAG: no forward secrecy today. ZAPLink’s current seal uses a static recipient key. Against an adversary who later compromises that key, not a quantum computer but a key compromise, previously captured datagrams could be opened. A post-quantum label on a channel without forward secrecy is a trust story the artifact does not support, so we state it plainly.
The fix is known and already designed in the estate: one-time pre-keys in the PQXDH style (the Route B design), where each node publishes a batch of ephemeral pre-keys so each message derives a fresh secret. Until that is wired and gated, ZAPLink is positioned as a fast sealed-delivery transport, not a forward-secret session protocol.
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