Capabilities

One sovereign core, many missions.

The same cryptographic and governance core is reused across federal mission areas, and that security core carries a layer of defense systems engineering drawn from the team's published research: counter-UAS and drone-swarm autonomy, modeling and simulation, systems federation, and interoperability. Each capability below names what it reuses and how it is delivered.

Capability 01

Cryptographic custody

Post-quantum key custody and sealed delivery on the sovereign edge. Device identity and firmware integrity are established first with ML-DSA signatures; confidentiality follows with ML-KEM key establishment. Custody is evidenced at every hop rather than asserted, and the key ledger is authoritative on the edge, never in a browser.

Device identity first

ML-DSA device identity and firmware integrity before any confidentiality claim.

Sealed delivery

ML-KEM key establishment with AEAD, verified end to end.

Edge-authoritative

The entitlement ledger lives on the edge; middleware holds a read-only snapshot.

Flag Specific algorithm parameters, certifications and quantitative security claims are owner-gated and are not published on this page until verified. Figures shown in demonstrations are labeled SAMPLE.

Capability 02

Secure OT & GIS enclaves

Zone-and-conduit reference architecture for operational technology and geospatial systems, with a PQC-sealed telemetry boundary. The GIS enclave hosts mission map front-ends and is where the satellite collision-avoidance work is demonstrated.

Capability 03

ZEUS decision platform

A governed workspace that turns strategic intent into decisions, plans and coordinated action, with traceability from intent through evidence to outcome and access granted intentionally per document.

Capability 04

Counter-UAS and drone swarms

Employment of drone swarms in command-and-control-challenged, GPS-denied environments, and the counter-small-UAS problem on the other side of it. A small team directs many platforms as one force, and the same understanding informs how to detect, degrade, and defeat an adversary swarm. This capability reuses the sovereign security core for device identity and command integrity, so an autonomous platform only acts on orders it can prove are authentic.

C2-denied employment

Operate a swarm when GPS and communications are contested, not only in a clean range environment.

Counter-sUAS

The defensive mirror: detect and defeat adversary small unmanned aircraft as part of the air and missile defense picture.

Signed command

ML-DSA command integrity so a platform rejects any order it cannot verify.

Grounded in NATO STO MSG-217 (drone-swarm employment) and the counter-sUAS use cases in the team's electronic-warfare research. See the publications page.

Capability 05

Autonomy

Layered individual and collective artificial intelligence: each platform reasons locally, and the group coordinates as a whole, so a small crew can supervise many systems rather than pilot each one. The approach extends beyond aircraft to the wider autonomy problem across unmanned aircraft systems, autonomous vehicles, and satellite communications. Autonomy here is bounded by the security core, with signed identity and signed commands setting what an autonomous system is permitted to do.

Grounded in the layered individual and collective AI of NATO STO MSG-217 and the team's work on secure communications for advanced-mobility systems (UAS, autonomous vehicles, and SATCOM). See the publications page.

Capability 06

Modeling and simulation

Mature modeling and simulation infrastructure applied to live operations: terrain generation, High Level Architecture broadcast, and WGS84 anchoring, used to treat the live fight as a virtual and constructive simulation. Done well, the simulation layer can stand in for denied infrastructure, for example forming a temporary jam-resistant positioning network when satellite navigation is unavailable. This is the connective tissue under the drone, autonomy, and interoperability work.

Terrain and anchoring

Generated terrain anchored to WGS84 so the simulated and the real share one coordinate frame.

HLA broadcast

High Level Architecture distribution so many simulations and live systems share one state.

Live as simulation

Treat the live fight as a virtual and constructive run to coordinate forces under denial.

Grounded in NATO STO MSG-217, "Operationalizing Modelling and Simulations for Drone Swarm Employment in a C2-Challenged Environment." The verbatim NATO title keeps its original spelling; see the publications page.

Capability 07

Systems federation

Independent systems, agencies, and nations rarely share one program of record. Federation is the discipline of composing them anyway: a High Level Architecture federation and a multi-agency, multinational system-of-systems in which each participant keeps its own authority while the whole presents one coordinated picture. The sovereign security core is what makes that safe to do across organizational boundaries, because trust between federated systems rests on verifiable identity rather than a shared perimeter.

Grounded in the HLA federation of NATO STO MSG-217 and the multinational system-of-systems argument of MSG-229. See the publications page.

Capability 08

Interoperability

Interoperability is proven, not declared. Live-Virtual-Constructive exercises are the practical path to a multinational integrated air-and-missile-defense capability: nations exercise their real systems against shared virtual and constructive forces until the seams show and are closed. It is the same modeling-and-simulation and federation machinery pointed at a coalition problem, and it is where the counter-UAS, autonomy, and M&S capabilities meet a live multinational mission.

Grounded in NATO STO MSG-229, "NATO LVC Exercises as the Interoperability Solution to a Multinational Iron Dome." See the publications page.