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Explosive threat planning, mitigation and strategy.
As subject-matter experts in explosive ordnance disposal operations, counter-IED and C-WMD, we offer clients technical support across a range of areas. The scope spans the spectrum of explosive threat planning, mitigation and strategy.
Capability is described here. Method is not.
Nothing on this page describes a technique, a procedure, an item of equipment, or any means of rendering safe or defeating anything. That is a standing professional and handling decision, and it applies to every channel we publish in. If a line would help someone build a device or defeat a countermeasure, it is not written down here.
Assess the threat, then plan against it.
A written assessment of the explosive threat to a specific site, route, facility, event or program, and the protective planning that follows from it, expressed as decisions someone can own.
Most explosive-threat assessments fail in the same place. They characterise a threat accurately and then stop, leaving the reader with an alarming document and no decision to make. The useful version ends in assigned responsibility, a sequence, and a short list of things that have to change this quarter.
What the engagement produces
- A written threat assessment scoped to a named site, route, event or program
- Protective planning at the planning level: responsibilities, sequencing, and the decisions that have to be pre-made
- A gap list against the organization’s own stated requirement, ranked by what is cheapest to close
- Advice on tools and equipment against a stated requirement, never a product specification and never a vendor recommendation on this site
- A briefing the risk owner can actually give to a board or a chief
A C-IED capability that is current, and can be shown to be current.
Program design, program review and readiness assessment for an organization that has to hold a counter-IED capability.
The hard part of a counter-IED program is not standing it up. It is keeping it honest in year three, when the people who built it have moved on, the qualification record has drifted, and the exercise that proves it works has quietly become the exercise that proves it exists.
Where this usually lands
- Design or review of a counter-IED program against the mission it is actually expected to perform
- Readiness assessment of an existing capability, including the currency and qualification record behind it
- Advice to a program office on what a capability must achieve, stated as requirements rather than as solutions
- Interagency and mutual-aid coordination: who is called, in what order, with what authority
Scope boundary. This is protective and programmatic work. We do not advise on device construction, exploitation, or any means of defeating a protective measure, and we do not accept engagements whose purpose is to affect somebody else’s system.
C-WMD is an authorities problem before it is a technical one.
Planning support, authority and coordination mapping, and exercise objectives for the counter-WMD mission.
Ask three agencies who is in charge of a C-WMD response in the first ninety minutes and you will get three confident, incompatible answers. Very little of that is a technical shortfall. It is a mapping problem (statute, directive, mutual aid, and a plan that nobody has read since it was signed) and it is solvable on paper before it is ever solvable in a field.
What the engagement produces
- Authority and coordination map for a named jurisdiction, installation or program
- Planning support against an existing plan, including the parts of it that have gone stale
- Exercise objectives that test the coordination, not the equipment
- An honest account of which shortfalls are technical and which are organizational, because the two carry completely different price tags
What you are postured to survive, and what you are postured to detect.
Defensive posture review across chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, with training standards and sustainment treated as part of the posture rather than as an afterthought.
Organizations tend to buy CBRN capability in a single budget year and then sustain it in none of the following ones. A posture review that ignores sustainment is a snapshot of a good day.
Where this usually lands
- Defensive posture review against the hazards an organization has actually decided to plan for
- Protection planning at the program level, including the training standard that keeps it real
- Fielding and sustainment advice: what it costs to still have the capability in year five
- Alignment of the CBRN plan with the wider emergency plan it is supposed to be part of
Not the task. The organization around the task.
Managing and directing explosive ordnance disposal operations: command relationships, qualification and currency, operational risk governance, and sustainment of the unit that has to do it.
This is the line that separates a senior EOD career from a technical one. Anybody can describe what an EOD element does. Far fewer people have been responsible for whether it is manned, qualified, current, correctly tasked and governed, and that is the layer at which most organizations are actually short.
What the engagement produces
- Organizational design and command relationships for an EOD element or its supporting structure
- Qualification, currency and continuation-training governance: the record, not the course
- Operational risk governance: who accepts which risk, in writing, and at what level
- Sustainment and manning review against the tasking the element is actually given
Guide, troubleshoot and maintain what you already run.
Most organizations that call do not need a new program. They need someone who has run the mission to look at the one they own and say plainly which part of it is not holding together.
Guide
Standing advice to a program manager or a security lead who has the authority to fix things and needs a second opinion that is not selling anything.
Troubleshoot
A short, bounded look at one thing that is wrong: a failed inspection, a near miss, an exercise that went badly, a capability nobody trusts any more.
Maintain
Periodic review on a cycle, so the program is examined by someone outside it before the regulator, the insurer or the incident does it first.
What is described here, and what is not
This site describes services and experience. It publishes no technique, no procedure, no equipment detail, and no render-safe or defeat methodology, not in summary, not in illustration, not in a case study. The test applied to every sentence on this site was a simple one: if a line would help someone build a device or defeat a countermeasure, it does not go on the page.
That is a deliberate professional standard and not a limitation of the work. The detail exists; it is delivered to the client who is authorized to receive it, in the channel appropriate to it.
What we do not take
No work whose purpose is to build, improve, exploit or defeat a device or a protective measure. No engagement that would require publishing controlled technical data. Every one of those exclusions is structural rather than a preference, and it shapes who we will work with.
Past performance
No client names, contract references, awards or testimonials appear on this site. They will appear when there are cleared ones to publish, and not before.
Which of the six is the reason you are reading this?
Say that in a paragraph and the first call will be a useful one.