Demonstration · transport
ZAPLink, sealed datagram transport
ZAPLink carries a post-quantum-sealed, signed payload between two agents over a single UDP datagram, with no connection setup and no handshake round trips. Because the ML-KEM seal and ML-DSA signature are computed before the packet is sent, the only thing on the wire is the delivery itself.
Measured
End-to-end latency vs common transports
Medians from a local benchmark run on 2026-10-23, same host, same payload class. ZAPLink delivers a sealed, signed message in roughly a third of the time an HTTPS/TLS exchange takes, because it adds no handshake round trips.
| Transport | End-to-end median | Adds PQC seal + signature? |
|---|---|---|
| SFTP / FTPS (one file) | 104.7 ms | No: classical transport, plain copy |
| ZAPLink (A2A over the diode) | 122.6 ms | Yes: ML-KEM seal + ML-DSA signature |
| HTTPS / TLS, cold | 303.0 ms | No: classical TLS handshake |
| HTTPS / TLS, session resumed | 310.5 ms | No |
| SMTP + STARTTLS (one mail) | 735.9 ms | No |
The cryptographic work is cheap and happens off the critical path: sealing a payload measured ~17.9 ms and reading it back ~7.5 ms, against a network round-trip of ~104.7 ms. ZAPLink is close to the raw SFTP floor while carrying a post-quantum seal and an ML-DSA signature that SFTP and TLS do not.
How it is fast
No handshake on the critical path
No TCP connect, no TLS negotiation: the seal and signature are already done when the packet leaves.
The honest caveat
ZAPLink does not yet provide forward secrecy
A fast, post-quantum-sealed channel is not automatically a forward-secret one, and we will not let the speed number imply a property the transport does not have.
FLAG: no forward secrecy today. The ZAPLink seal currently uses a static recipient key. Against an adversary who later compromises that key, not a quantum computer, a key compromise, previously captured datagrams could be opened. A post-quantum label on a channel without forward secrecy is a trust story the artifact does not support, so we state it plainly.
The fix is known and already designed in the estate: one-time pre-keys in the PQXDH style (the Route B design), where each node publishes a batch of ephemeral pre-keys so each message derives a fresh secret. Until that is wired and gated, ZAPLink is positioned as a fast sealed-delivery transport, not a forward-secret session protocol.
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